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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background 
 
 
Merger and acquisition have been an effective asset development strategy for 
corporate America since the early 1900s. Historically, four major waves of such activities 
have contributed to the U.S. economic infrastructure and corporate development changes. 
The involved industries have shifted from heavy manufacturing and mining areas to the 
more service driven sectors. Accordingly, activity themes have also evolved throughout 
the four waves.  
Merging for monopoly is the feature of the first wave (prior to 1900). Major 
producers in numerous industries began horizontal integrations in search of market 
dominance. The following market crash led to the creation of Federal Trade Commission. 
The second wave started in 1920 and peaked in 1928. Merging for oligopoly, one third of 
the activities occurred in the banking and public utility sectors during the nine years. The 
epitome of the third wave (mid 1950’s and peaked in 1967-1969) was merging for growth 
and synergy. Acquired firms included small- to medium-sized firms in fragmented 
markets. The strategy of corporate diversification into new product markets became 
popular. Started in 1975 and ended by 1991, the fourth wave heavily involved 
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service industries, such as sectors of finance and bank.  It’s interesting to note that the 
service-oriented industries accounted for over 30% of all mergers and acquisitions in that 
period. Later in the 1990s, hostile takeovers became a common scene. Most activities 
were increasingly becoming corporate divestures as companies swapped assets and 
started to search for better portfolios of business (Gilson, Meyers, Stern, and Black, 
1995).  
The twenty first century unfolds with some ups and downs in the levels of merger 
and acquisition activities.  The sluggish developments in 2001 and 2002 were later 
reversed by the surge of financial sponsors and CEO’s confidence in strategic 
acquisitions since 2003. The robust increase continued to 2006. More and more merger 
and acquisition activities have become an effective corporate strategy to supplement 
international growth and “soul searching” for core business. During 2005, the Americas 
accounted for 48% of global merger and acquisition activities with the total dollar 
volume of 1,298. 8 billion (Barshay and Falk, 2006). 
With the fast growth of domestic and international economy in the last several 
years, the hotel industry has enjoyed steady improvement in its operating revenues and 
profit margin, resulting in strong stock performance. The ascent in real estate values has 
also attracted a broad range of investors who are interested in the underlying assets of 
hotel companies. Consequently, the combination of unprecedented appreciation in hotel 
assets and strong cash flows has led to an abundance of consolidation in the hospitality 
industry, and most recently, a number of leveraged buy-out transactions such as Fairmont 
Hotel and Four Seasons (Yang and Kim, 2007). The industry today appears much less 
fragmented. The trend of consolidation is likely to continue in the foreseeable future (Hsu 
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and Jang, 2006). 
Canina (2001) estimated that from 1982 through 2000, the lodging industry had 
57 acquisitions with total market value in the target company’s stock over $53 billion. 
The increase in the total market value is 1,000 times greater from 1993 to 1998 for public 
and private mergers combined. Public lodging companies took a leading role in the 
activities. In comparison, these companies had 25 more transactions with a total of $ 
44,354.4 million over the private lodging companies. The specifics in both the private 
and public lodging industry acquisitions were illustrated in Appendix one. The Hotel and 
Real Estate Investment Trust (REITs) sectors have also experienced profound 
transformation in recent years. One of the major developments has been consolidation at 
various scales and levels (Yang and Kim, 2007). Overall, the last two decades of the 
twentieth century witnessed a record growth of merger and acquisition in the hospitality 
industry that peaked in the late 1990s.  
Accompanied by asset exchange is the payment change in the transaction.  In the 
1960’s, common stock or equivalents such as convertible debt, convertible preferred, or 
debt plus warrants were dominant; while in the mid 70’s, cash replaced equity to become 
the principal payment method in the transaction. In 2005, 60% of global merger and 
acquisition activities were entirely cash transactions, as compared to lows of 27-28% in 
the three years from 1998 to 2000 (Barshay and Falk, 2006). The combination of cash 
and stock remains a common form of payment even though less popular. It represents 
28% of global merger and acquisition activities in 2005, down from the high of 48% in 
2001 (Barshay and Falk, 2006). 
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In principle, significant forces in payment selection include marginal tax rates, the 
magnitude of capital gains, the strength of the economy, and the stock itself (Gilson, 
Meyers, Stern, and Black, 1995). Historically, the relationship between the premiums 
paid in a successful acquisition and the acquirers’ stock prices over time is negative. In 
other words, the higher the premiums paid to the target company, the weaker the stock 
performance of the acquiring company in the long run. Some empirical research shows 
that the issuance of equity has been flagged as a negative sign in the market and is often 
trailed with reduction in the firm value (Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek, 2005).  
The Problem 
 
 
A well-accepted perception in the literature of merger and acquisition is that 
target firms receive larger gains in the activity compared to the acquiring firms 
surrounding the announcement of the event (Gilson, Meyers, Stern, and Black, 1995).  
Yet previous empirical studies found controversial results on the abnormal returns to the 
acquirers (Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, Jr., 1983; Canina, 
2001; Dodd, 1980; Asquith, 1983; Sheel and Nagpal, 2000; Hsu and Jang, 2006; and 
Yang and Kim, 2007); limited attention has attributed to the abnormal returns and the 
effect of different transaction media on the gains to the acquirers in the long term.  
Objectives of the Study 
 
 
This study aims to examine the long-term returns and the association with 
payment methods in the context of the U.S. hospitality acquiring firms. More specifically, 
this study has the following three objectives: 
1. Examine long term returns of hospitality acquiring firms; 
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2. Explore the differences on long term returns to the hospitality acquiring 
firms between cash payment and equity payment; and,  
3. Evaluate the relationship between returns and payment methods with 
regard to relative and absolute merger size over time.  
Significance of the Study 
 
 
Previous studies have contributed to the understanding of abnormal returns of 
acquiring companies in the short term. S & P 500 market index is assigned as market 
benchmark. In the study, hospitality indices are applied to offer a more industry relevant 
explanation for merger effect. Studies of payment methods in merger and acquisition 
activities are also limited in the hospitality industry. The result of the study is beneficial 
to hospitality executives in decisions of whether to initiate merger deals and which means 
to complete transactions. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) classifies a merger into three categories: 
horizontal, vertical, product and market concentric or conglomerate categories. Previous 
literature emphasized the fundamental understanding of synergy. Synergy is created 
when two companies are better off together than apart (Lubatkin, 1983).  
The universally acknowledged rule for mergers suggests that as long as the 
prospective returns of the combining enterprises are not perfectly correlated, the 
surviving firm will yield an income stream for its owners having less dispersion per 
dollar of expected return than would be attainable by holding only one of its predecessors. 
On the other hand, to claim that the market will pay premium for the new income stream 
ignores the opportunity which individual investors had prior to the merger to combine the 
predecessor shares in their own portfolios (Michel and Shaked, 1985, p.109). 
Applied Models 
 
 
Modern Portfolio Theory & Cumulative Average Residuals  
 
 
Intuitively, acquiring firms benefit from merger due to technical, pecuniary, and 
diversification synergies. However, empirical studies of various industries, especially the 
financial industry using the capital asset pricing model, report gains mainly to the 
shareholders of the acquired firms (Lubatkin, 1983). 
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In general, most studies on the short term returns apply an “event-study” 
framework, or “residual analysis”. Relatively large samples of mergers were required. 
The return on common stock of both the acquiring and acquired firms prior to the “event” 
date was studied. Event date is a reference date from which analysis is made. The 
procedure begins with an adjustment of the stock risk by using Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT) to calculate Beta. This theory suggests that the expected return on a security is the 
sum of risk free rate of interest using Treasury Bill rate and a risk premium (Michel and 
Shaked, 1985).  Abnormal residual occurs when there is a difference between the actual 
return and the predicted return by MPT. For each firm in the sample, daily residuals are 
averaged, and for each day, the residuals are averaged for all firms in the sample.   
Cumulative average residuals (or CARs) is applied by cumulating these average 
residuals over a period of time to study the impact of the merger on the shareholders’ 
wealth. Michel and Shaked’s survey (1985) indicated that stockholders of target firms 
earned abnormal gains from the mergers while acquiring firms gained less significant 
returns than comparable non-acquisitive companies or the average of the acquiring firms’ 
home-base industries. MPT and CARs models are commonly used for measuring short-
term returns, in other words, market reaction to merger announcement.  
The Jensen Measure 
 
 
Previous literature (Frank, 1991; Sheel & Nagpal, 2000; Hsu and Jang, 2006; 
Yang and Kim, 2007) suggested that the Jensen Measure (Jensen, 1968), expressed as the 
intercept of the regression of the excess return of the acquiring firms on the excess return 
of the market index, offers a reasonable measure of merger performance for acquirers in 
the long term.  
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The Jensen Measure of the portfolio p (α p, t), the excess return for company p, 
and the excess return of the market portfolio were expressed using the equation (1) 
(Jensen, 1968).  
(R p, t – R f, t) = α p, t + β p, t (R m, t – R f, t) + ε p, t                                             (1) 
Where, 
R p, t = shareholder return for acquirer p in month t, which is the spread of the return on 
month t and t-1 divided by the return on month t-1, 
R f, t = monthly U.S. Treasury Bills, which is 1/12th of the yearly yield, 
R p, t – R f, t = the excess return for company p in month t, 
α p, t =  the Jensen Index of company p measuring abnormal performance,  
β p, t = volatility coefficient of company p to the S & P 500 index, 
R m, t = return on market index in month t, which is expressed as the spread of the S& P 
500 index return on month t and t-1 divided by the return on month t-1,  
R m, t – R f, t = the excess  return for the S & P 500 market portfolio,  
t = month relative to the announcement date (t = 0 is the announcement month), 
ε p,t = a random and serially independent error with mean zero. 
Empirical Results on Abnormal Returns 
 
 
Industry-specific empirical research shared some commonalities (Dodd and 
Ruback, 1977; Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, Jr., 1983; Canina, 2001) while others 
indicated opposite results (Dodd, 1980; Asquith, 1983; Sheel and Nagpal, 2000; Hsu and 
Jang, 2006). It is noticeable these studies differ in the sample time periods, definitions of 
event date, models used to generate abnormal returns, time frames prior to and post 
merger, payment methods, merger sizes, and merger types.  
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 Dodd and Ruback (1977) studied a sample of 172 bidding firms and 172 target 
firms to analyze market reaction to both successful and unsuccessful tender offers. The 
results indicated that target firm stockholders gained positive and significant abnormal 
returns of 20.58% for successful offers and 18.96% for unsuccessful offers. The 
stockholders of the acquiring firms also earned positive abnormal gains in the month of 
announcement but their gains were smaller compared to that of the target firms.  
Dodd (1980) continued to study a comprehensive sample of the public 
announcement of proposals to acquire. In total, the author studied 151 merger proposals 
during 1971 to 1977. The study showed that there was a swift and positive reaction to the 
approval of completed proposals and a negative reaction to cancelled proposals. For the 
stockholders of the target firms, they generally earned large positive abnormal returns 
from the announcement of the proposals, regardless of the completion of the proposal. 
For the shareholders of the bidder firms, a negative abnormal return of -7.22 to -5.50% 
was reported.  
Asquith (1983) studied stock returns for the entire merger process for both 
successful and unsuccessful merger bids. The author suggested that target firms created 
synergy by providing unique resources; however the shareholders of the acquiring firms 
gained insignificant benefit from the merger, if any. Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, Jr. 
(1983) focused exclusively on the gains for the stockholders of the acquiring firms. To 
test the hypothesis of whether shareholders of bidding firms benefit from mergers, the 
study examined bidding firms for period 1955-1979. Their research showed significant 
gains to the acquiring firms during the twenty-one days prior to the announcement of 
bids.  Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) studied the postmerger performance while 
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others (Dodd, 1980; Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, Jr., 1983) focused on the effect of the 
announcement gains. The authors examined share-price performance of post 399 
corporate takeovers during 1975-1984 using multifactor benchmarks (Lehmann and 
Modest, 1987; Grinblatt and Titman, 1988 and 1989). They further analyzed the 
subgroups of the sample to evaluate potential determinants of postmerger performance 
such as payment in the merger, the relative sizes of the target and the bidder, the level of 
opposition by incumbent management, and the presence of competing bidders. With 
cross sectional analysis in event time and portfolio analysis in calendar time, the authors 
found that different benchmarks generated significantly different measures of postmerger 
performance.   
Canina’s research (2001) was among the first endeavors to focus on the merger 
effect in the hospitality industry. The author found significant positive returns for both 
the acquired lodging firms and acquiring lodging firms on the merger-announcement day. 
The author argued that merger and acquisition in the lodging industry involved 
companies with similar core business; moreover, the senior managers possessed a 
comparatively larger portion of shares in the equity than in other industries, thus they 
shared ultimate interest with owners of the business. These characteristics made the 
merger and acquisition in the lodging industry different from other industries. Hence, it 
was rational to see that acquisitions in the lodging industry increased equity value for the 
shareholders.  
 In contrast to Canina (2001), Hsu and Jang (2006) found out negative returns 
significant from zero over the long term for hospitality acquiring firms using the Jensen 
Measure. Yang and Kim (2007) shared some similarities with Hsu and Jang (2006) only 
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when industry relevant indices were selected. Yet when selecting the S & P 500 as 
market benchmark, the study derived significant positive returns over the long term for 
hospitality acquiring firms.  
In general, it is acknowledged that target firms receive more abnormal returns 
than the bidding firm. However, the effect of merger on acquiring firms has yet come to a 
consensus. The inconclusiveness is often resulted from the diverse research focus and 
directions. One of the most controversial aspects is the effect of payment methods. Extant 
literature has advised that the methods of payment are important factors for abnormal 
returns to both bidding and target firms. However, there are limited studies that provide 
direct correlations between the bidding firms’ differential returns and the different 
methods of payment. In fact, the empirical results are often conflicting (Travlos, 1987).   
Theories of Payment methods 
 
 
Theoretically, there are three competing theories on payment methods in 
association with the returns to the bidders: the payment signaling hypothesis, the 
overpayment hypothesis, and the present value hypothesis (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 
1987).  
Payment Signaling Theory 
 
 
The extant signaling hypothesis originated from the Myers and Majluf’s 
asymmetric information model (1984). The model suggests that method of payment may 
provide valuable information to the market. Angelo and others (1984) are among the first 
who argued that payment method in the merger transaction was a signal of the true value 
of the bidding firm.  
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If the acquiring firm has information concerning its intrinsic value, which is not 
fully represented in the preacquisition stock price, the management can choose to finance 
the acquisition in the most beneficial way for its existing shareholders (Tavlos, 1987). 
Generally, overvalued acquirers have an incentive to offer stock and undervalued 
acquirers pay with cash. Specifically, if the future market value of outstanding stocks of 
the acquiring firm is assessed as lower than the current quote, acquirers will choose stock 
as the media of exchange (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987). Cash financing occurs when 
acquiring companies has a favorable valuation for its future stock performance. 
Therefore, the methods of payment may release information of the future prospects of the 
acquiring company to the market. Stock offerings signal a negative sign.  
Empirical studies on the signaling hypothesis are widely tested. On one hand, 
evidence from a number of researchers (Conn and Nielsen,1977; Bradley, 1980; Asquith, 
Bruner, and Mullins, 1983; Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Franks, 
Harris, and Mayer, 1988;) suggested that cash offers accumulate positive gains for the 
acquirers and equity offers result in capital loss. On the other hand, a more recent study 
by Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005) found stock exchange created significantly 
larger combined gains shared between the sellers and buyers in inter-corporate asset 
sales.  
Conn and Nielsen (1977) associated negative results with equity exchanges. In the 
context of L-G model (formal model of premium payment determination for mergers 
developed by Larson and Gonedes), they found wealth loss both to the acquired and 
acquiring firms with greater loss to the latter.      
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While Conn and Nielsen (1977) showed negative returns to the bidding firms with 
equity offers, Bradley (1980) suggested positive returns associated with cash offers. The 
proposed theory of tender offers suggested that the information released from the offer 
motivates other firms to initiate value-increasing changes in the operations of the target 
firm. A proportion of the future return from preparing the tender offer becomes available 
once the formal offer starts. Successful completion of cash offers was a value-increasing 
activity for both target and bidding firms. On the surface, acquiring firms failed to gain 
from the appreciation of the target firm shares and suffered a capital loss on the target 
shares that they purchase. Eventually they benefited from the transaction due to the 
value-increasing effect of the underlying synergy in the long run.  In the study, 161 
successful cash offers realized an average of 9% increase in the market value for the 
bidding firms on their own shares.  
With an attempt to test the three conflicting payment hypotheses, Wansley and 
others (1987) studied a sample of 199 acquisitions with 64 cash transactions and 118 
securities exchanges between 1970 and 1978. Consistent with the payment signaling 
hypothesis, their results showed a significant positive 6.17 % abnormal gains in the 
cumulative daily residuals (CARs) for the bidding firms using cash payment. Meanwhile, 
their study yielded an insignificant negative 1.51 % with the securities transaction around 
the announcement of merger.  
Travlos (1987) was a pioneer in identifying a direct relation between the different 
returns and different methods of payments. With a sample of 167 acquiring firms, the 
study tested the effect of three different payment methods: cash, stock, and combination 
of the two. The study showed a significant loss on pure stock exchanges and normal rate 
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of returns on cash offers for acquirers. And the differences between the two groups are 
statistically significant and independent of acquisition types.  
 Contrary to Myers and Majluf’s model (1984) and fellow researchers (Conn and 
Nielsen, 1977; Bradley, 1980; Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983; Wansley, Lane, and 
Yang, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Franks, Harris, and Mayer, 1988 ;), Slovin and others (2005) 
hypothesized that the willingness of the seller to accept equity offers have a bearing on 
the returns to sellers and buyers. Since equity sales have a common valuation orientation 
for both parties, both parities would gain from such actions through the increase of the 
buyers share price. The acceptance automatically exposes the seller to the risk of buyer 
valuation and its performance prior, thus the gesture signals positive values for the seller 
and the buyer. Their results showed significant 9.77% abnormal returns for buyers of 
equity sales. And in total of 89 sales, 80% generate positive gains for the buyers. The 
study challenged the previous widely held view on the negative effect of equity sales.  
Overpayment Theory 
 
 
The second hypothesis, overpayment hypothesis, argues for smaller gains or 
losses to the bidding firms with cash offers. The theory suggests that cash offers often 
pay higher premiums for target companies due to several factors: competition, tax effects, 
regulatory requirements, and the increasing popularity of cash acquisitions.  However, the 
empirical support for the overpayment theory is inclusive (Gordon and Yagil, 1981; 
Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1983; and Sung, 1993). 
Theoretically, target companies are more likely to choose cash bidders with 
higher premiums. From the bidder’s side, cash offers are an effective corporate finance 
strategy to preempt a potential competing bidder. Moreover, shareholders of the target 
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companies demand higher premium for cash offers due to capital gains tax. In an equity 
acquisition, there are no immediate capital gains; therefore, investors are not subjected to 
capital gains tax liability when they accept stocks of the acquiring company. These taxes 
are deferred until investors choose to sell and realize the gains. Whereas in the cash 
acquisition, investors’ gains must be realized for tax purposes, thus resulting in a tax 
liability at the capital gains tax rate (Franks, Harris, and Mayer, 1988). 
Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) studied 203 acquisitions in the 1970s. The 
researchers found that target shareholders in cash offers received twice as many returns 
as shareholders in stock offers. Similar differences in abnormal returns were also 
recorded by Gordon and Yagil (1981) (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987).  
In a comparison study of all competing hypotheses, Sung (1993) focused on the 
overpayment hypothesis and the effects of overpayment with a sample of 159 cash offers 
and 63 stock exchange offers during 1974 to 1980. The study found significant negative 
abnormal returns to the bidders with both cash and stock offers in 1980s and insignificant 
negative returns in 1970s. This study argued that the overpayment effects were essential 
to understand the market reaction to takeover bids in the 1980s.  
Present Value Theory  
 
 
The third hypothesis on payment is the present value theory. It suggests minimal 
gains to bidding firms, if any, and the gains should not be significantly different from 
zero. Under an efficient market, the merger releases positive information about the target; 
other bidders are free to enter the competition. The merger and acquisition activities are 
argued to be net present value projects for the bidder (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987). 
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Arguably a variant of present value theory (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987), the 
hubris hypothesis suggests that merger activity is a zero net present value project. The 
gains accumulated to the target company equals to the losses of the bidding firms due to 
management valuation errors and overpayment. The hubris theory implies that the 
bidding company experiences wealth losses through merger activities. This theory has yet 
to be tested empirically. In sum, the differences in the literature on the gains to the 
bidding firms are summarized in the table below. 
Table 1 
 
ABNORNAL GAINS TO BIDDING FIRMS UNDER FOUR CONTENDING 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 Signaling Overpayment Present Value Hubris 
Cash offers Positive Negative Zero Negative 
Equity offers Negative Positive Zero Negative 
Adapted from Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) 
Hypotheses 
 
 
To test the implications of theories above, this study examines abnormal returns 
to acquiring firms and the impact of different payment methods in the long term. More 
specifically, this study aims to examine the following three hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1. 
The acquiring hospitality firms generate abnormal returns significantly different from 
zero from the merger activities over the long term.  
Hypothesis 2 
The acquiring hospitality firms generate significantly different abnormal returns between 
stock financing and cash financing over the long term. 
Hypothesis 3.  
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The long term returns to the shareholders of the acquiring hospitality firms are 
significantly associated with payment of financing. 
 Another important factor related to payment methods is the size of target and 
acquiring firms. It is suggested that the larger the merger size, the larger and more 
positive the acquiring firm’s return. Both the relative size and the absolute size of merger 
were argued to have important effect on merger returns of bidding firm (Asquith, Bruner, 
and Mullins, 1983 and 1986). In order to test the effect of size and the interaction of size 
and form of financing, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 3a.  
The long term returns to the shareholders of the acquiring hospitality firms are 
significantly associated with payment of financing under relative size control.  
Hypothesis 3b.  
The long term returns to the shareholders of the acquiring hospitality firms are 
significantly associated with payment of financing under absolute size control.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Data 
 
 
 A company’s financial success can be measured by many parameters; however, 
the stock performance of a public company remains the most important and often the 
most objective barometer. For a company that has gone through a merger and acquisition, 
the financial benefit often takes an extended period of time to become apparent, as the 
change in management and integration of businesses is often accomplished over time. 
The transformation adjustment is often highly dependent on the scale and nature of the 
merging companies' business (Yang and Kim, 2007). 
In practice, it is difficult to separate the pure impact of a merger from any shift in 
the general business environment.  This is particularly common for lodging companies 
and REITS, since their business cycles are highly correlated with the general health of the 
economy and the economic cycle. Therefore, it is important to study beyond the 
performance of the acquiring companies themselves. Their performance should be 
measured against their respective industry sectors (Yang and Kim, 2007).  
All hospitality acquirers which completed merger deals between 1996 and 2007 
were queried from the database of Bloomberg. There was a proliferation of merger and  
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divesture activities during this period in which the U.S. economy went through the 
volatile technology boom and bust of the early 90s. Bloomberg database is provided 
through Bloomberg Terminal, a core product of Bloomberg L.P., a leading financial news 
and data company. Founded in 1981 by Michael Bloomberg, Bloomberg database 
provides financial software tools, such as analytics, data services, and news, to financial 
companies and organizations around the world (www.bloomberg.com).  
Two sector indices were extracted from the database, Bloomberg US Lodging 
index and Bloomberg REIT Hotels Index. Bloomberg US Lodging index is a 
capitalization-weighted index of 16 leading US lodging stocks. Bloomberg REIT Hotels 
Index is a capitalization weighted index of leading REIT companies with at least 75% of 
assets invested in hotel properties (www.bloomberg.com). In the study, monthly data of 
stock returns, T-bill yields, and sector indices were extracted from Bloomberg beginning 
the month after the merger and acquisition announcement date. Market values one day 
after the announcement day for both acquiring and target firms were collected across all 
sample. Absolute merger size is the actual merger announcement total value in dollars 
and relative merger size is the absolute mergers size divided by the total value of 
acquiring firms at the time (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1990).  
 The data filtering process took the following steps. First, all hospitality-related 
mergers and acquisitions between January 1996 and March 2007 in the United States 
were queried from the database. There were 229 completed deals with 67 billion dollars 
in total announced acquisition value.  
The financing forms for these mergers included cash, stock, debt, and any 
combination of the three forms. This study examined the separate effect of cash and 
 20 
equity financing only. Some acquiring firms kept the payment information and merger 
total value confidential. These data points were eliminated. 
A number of acquirers made multiple acquisitions in the period of interest.  To 
isolate the correlation from each merger, the study adopted the following criteria : 1) if 
the acquirer made multiple mergers within the same 12 month period, only the largest 
size deals (in announced acquisition value) were kept; 2) if multiple deals had 
comparable sizes in less than 12 month period, only the most recent deal was kept; 3) if a 
company made multiple acquisitions separated by over 12 month in time, the authors kept 
both deals, effectively treating each transaction as independent data point. Only public 
hospitality acquirers traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and National Association of Security Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) were included. Further comparisons against SIC code by Ward’s Business 
Directory confirmed the selected merger deals were hospitality firms, whose SIC codes 
are either 7011 for hotel and motel or 6798/6799 for REITs. The filtering process led to a 
final sample of 19 U.S. hospitality acquirers with 9 stock offers and 10 cash offers; the 19 
acquirers included 11 lodging and 8 REITs.    
Model 
 
 
 The study used secondary data. The objective was to develop a better 
understanding of returns and the effect of payment methods on returns of hospitality 
acquirers in the long run.   
In a previous study (Hsu and Jang, 2006), the S&P 500 Index was selected as the 
benchmark portfolio. Yang and Kim (2007) found that different abnormal returns were 
indicated using different benchmarks; and industry indices offered a more accurate 
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measurement of excess returns in the long term. More specifically, positive and 
significant abnormal returns were indicated for shareholders of lodging mergers when the 
S & P 500 was selected as the benchmark; shareholders of the REITs mergers received 
positive gains when compared with the S & P 500; yet both lodging and REITs acquirers’ 
abnormal returns decreased when the industry indices were selected as the benchmark.  
Further comparison of the S & P 500 index with the sector indices indicated that 
the hospitality sectors clearly outperformed the general market in the past eight years 
(from 1999 to 2007) as shown in Exhibit 1. Bloomberg Lodging index and Bloomberg 
REITs hotel index were applied as sector indices. In addition, lodging sector 
outperformed the REITs companies. The S & P 500, Lodging, and REITs indices were 
converted to facilitate comparison. From the figure below, it follows that hospitality 
industry as a whole outperformed the overall market in the period of interest.  
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Figure 1. The S & P 500 Index vs. Bloomberg REITS and Lodging Index 
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Consistent with the previous study (Yang and Kim, 2007), the study incorporated 
both Lodging and REITs hotel indices in the equation (2) for the modified Jensen 
Measure. Lodging index and REITs index are applied for each subgroup.  
(R p, t – R f, t) = α’p, t + β’ p, t (R’ m, t – R f, t) + ε’ p, t                                         (2) 
where, 
R p, t = shareholder return for acquirer p in month t, which is the spread of the return on 
month t and t-1 divided by the return on month t-1, 
R f, t = monthly U.S. Treasury Bills, which is 1/12th of the yearly yield, 
R p, t – R f, t = the excess return for company p in month t, 
α'p, t = the modified Jensen Index of company p measuring long term abnormal returns,  
β’ p, t = volatility coefficient of company p to the lodging/REITs index, 
R’ m,t = return on market index in month t, which is expressed as the spread of the sector  
index return on month t and t-1 divided by the return on month t-1,  
R’ m, t – R f, t = the excess return for the sector portfolio, 
t = month relative to the announcement date (t = 0 is the announcement month), 
ε’ p, t = a random and serially independent error with mean zero. 
 First, the data were grouped into two sectors of lodging and REITs. Each lodging 
and REITs group had one pooled α’ p, t measuring abnormal returns in the long term. 
Lodging and REITs groups were compared. The study then pooled α’ p, t from both 
groups. The pooled α’ p, t and its p value helped to test hypothesis 1 in equation (2).  
Secondly, the data broke into two groups based on payment methods. One 
represented cash offers and the other stock offers. Abnormal returns of each group were 
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calculated independently with equation (2). Independent T-test was applied to study the 
differences on the abnormal return of cash offers and stock offers to test hypothesis 2.  
Thirdly, regression analysis was used to test the association of the effect of 
merger size and the form of financing on the excess returns of the acquiring firms. The 
study modified the regression model proposed by Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1990) to 
test the power of association in equation (3).  Acquirers’ stock percentage excess returns 
on three, six, nine, and twelve months were cross-sectionally regressed against the form 
of financing with relative size control. The dummy variable was used to differentiate 
forms of payment testing hypothesis 3a in equation (3) with 0-1 coding conversion.  
(R p, t – R f, t) = β0 + β1 Sizep + β2D + ε                      (3) 
where, 
R p, t – R f, t = the percentage excess return for company p in month t,  
β0 = the coefficient of intercept,  
β1, β2 = regression coefficients, 
Sizep = the relative merger size of the target firm p, i.e. the announced merger value 
divided by the equity value of the acquiring firm,   
   D =
 
the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if cash is the only announced financing 
and 0 if common stock is the only announced financing, 
ε = a random and serially independent error with mean zero. 
The absolute size of the merger was also studied in equation (4).  
(R p, t – R f, t)  = β’ 0 + β’1 Mervalp + β’2D + ε’                       (4) 
where, 
R p, t – R f, t = the percentage excess return for company p in month t,  
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β
’ 
0  = the coefficient of intercept,  
β
’
1, β
’
2 = regression coefficients, 
Mervalp = the announced value of merger,   
D
 
=
 
the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if cash is the only announced financing 
and 0 if common stock is the only announced financing, 
ε
’
 = a random and serially independent error with mean zero.  
Limitation 
 
 
The study has several limitations. First of all, the study collected data from 1996 
to 2007. The early part of the study period was during a time of significant overall market 
performance. The hotel sector, in particular, has very positive cash flows and profit 
margin. Therefore, the concern of generalization remains an issue.  
      Second, the study has small data points of 19 completed merger deals. Hotel and 
REITs companies are mostly cash intensive and more prone to select cash transactions. 
Recent trend of merger transaction also favors cash payment. For mergers that paid with 
stock and debt, the study treats those as stock offers. Limited number of pure stock offers 
is another challenge for the study.  
 Third, the study operationalizes the long term stock return as the percentage 
excess return. Future studies can convert the percentage returns to dollar-wise returns for 
better comparison.  
Since both Bloomberg REITs and Lodging Index are available only after the mid 
1990s, it’s challenging to study hospitality merger and acquisitions dated before 1990s 
with the two indices. Future studies can select other industry relevant indices with an 
extended period of more than 30 years. With a larger pool of data points, further 
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comparisons can be made between combination of payment methods and the single 
financing methods of either cash or stock on the dollar returns of acquiring companies.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Windows Version 14.0 (SPSS 
14.0) was used to analyze the data.  The purpose of the regression was to test whether 
hospitality firms receive abnormal gains from merger and acquisition after the activities 
and the association of payment methods and merger size with the excess return of 
acquiring firms.  
Long Term Performance of Hospitality Acquirers 
 
 
Long Term Performance of Individual Hospitality Acquirers 
 
 
Table 2 indicates the results of the regression on the sector indices for individual 
hospitality acquirers. In general, there are a total of 19 hospitality companies’ data 
available with 8 in REITs and 11 in lodging, 10 cash offers and 9 stock offers. The 
Jensen Measures of 9 acquirers are negative and 10 acquirers are positive. For the 11 
lodging acquirers, the alphas for 7 acquirers are positive and 4 are negative; for the 8 
REITs acquirers, the alphas for 3 acquirers are positive and 5 are negative. For the 
payment groups, the alphas for 6 cash payment are positive and 4 are negative; for the 
stock payment, the alpha for 6 acquirers are positive and 3 are negative. Among all 
studied acquirers, the alphas for four firms are statistically significant. Ameristar Casinos 
Inc (ASCA), in the lodging group and with cash payment, has gained substantial  
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abnormal returns of 15.51% and its t statistics is 3.89 at .05 level. Harrah’s Entertainment 
Inc (SHO), in the lodging group and with stock payment, has yielded significant negative 
returns of -2.37% and its t statistics is -2.35 at .05 level. MGM Mirage (MGM), in the 
lodging group and with stock payment, has received significant positive gains of 5.30% 
and its t statistics is 2.22 at .05 level. Felcor Lodging Trust Inc (FCH), in the REITs 
group and with stock payment, has suffered negative loss of -2.5% and its t statistics is -
1.92 at 0.1 level. The specifics are listed below. 
Table 2.  
 
JENSEN MEASURE ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL ACQUIRERS  
(C=cash, S=Stock, L=lodging, and R=REITs)  
(R p, t – R f, t) = α’p, t + β’ p, t (R’ m, t – R f, t) + ε p,t 
 
Acquirer Name Payment Sector α’p, t T-statistics β’ p, t T-statistics 
AMERISTAR CASINOS INC (ASCA) C L 15.51% 3.42*** 1.23 3.89** 
STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS (BEE) C R 0.32% 0.24 0.61 1.84 
FELCOR LODGING TRUST INC (FCH) C R -1.80% -1.17 0.48 2.20* 
HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST (HPT) C R -0.77% -0.80 0.79 3.08** 
LASALLE HOTEL PROPERTIES (LHO ) C R -0.30% -0.2 1.31 3.03** 
LA QUINTA CORP-PAIRED (LQI) C L 0.58% 0.33 0.31 1.08 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL-CL A (MAR ) C L -0.36% -0.37 0.56 3.48*** 
MORGANS HOTEL GROUP CO (MHGC) C L 1.60% 0.40 0.77 1.13 
0SUNSTONE HOTEL INVESTORS INC (SHO) C R -1.41% -1.43 0.65 2.23* 
STATION CASINOS INC( STN) C L -0.58% -0.27 0.91 3.16** 
HARRAH'S ENTERTAINMENT INC (HET) S L -2.37% -2.35** 1.18 7.24*** 
HILTON HOTELS CORP (HLT) S L -1.84% -0.56 1.14 2.17* 
HOST HOTELS & RESORTS INC (HST) S R 0.18% 0.46 1.41 11.81*** 
PATRIOT AMER HOSPITALITY INC (PAH) S R 0.78% 0.37 1.41 4.85*** 
MGM MIRAGE (MGM) S L 5.30% 2.22* 1.34 4.54*** 
HARRAH'S ENTERTAINMENT INC (HET) S L 3.43% 0.95 0.53 1.12 
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT INC (CZR) S L 5.49% 1.58 1.18 2.59** 
 FELCOR LODGING TRUST INC (FCH)  S R -2.50% -1.92* 0.31 1.90* 
BOYD GAMING CORP (BYD ) S L 4.11% 1.64 0.75 1.78 
                           Note: α’p, t = abnormal returns, β’= volatility coefficient, *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Long Term Performance of Sub-group Hospitality Acquirers 
 
Further comparisons of sub-groups are listed in Table 3. The alphas of four 
groups of REITs, Lodging, Cash offers, and Stock offers are pooled. The Jensen Measure 
of the lodging acquirers is 2.75% and the t-statistic is 3.0. The positive alpha and the 
significant t value suggest that the lodging shareholders receive positive gains in the 
studied period. The Jensen Measure of the REITs acquirers is -0.66% and the t-statistics 
is -1.31.  The negative alpha and the insignificant p value suggest that the REITs 
shareholders underperform lodging acquirers and they fail to receive significant positive 
gains from merger activities.  
The Jensen Measure of cash offer acquirers is 1.28% (t=1.57) and that for stock 
offer acquirers is 1.36% (t=1.64). The Jensen Measure of all the pooled data is 1.30% and 
the t-statistics is 2.26. The positive alpha and the significant p-value at .05 level indicate 
that the studied hospitality acquirers has experienced significant positive equity increases 
different from zero from 1996-2007. The results support hypothesis 1. 
Table 3.  
 
JENSEN MEASURE ANALYSIS OF GROUP ACQUIRERS  
(R p, t – R f, t) = α’p, t + β’ p, t (R’ m, t – R f, t) + ε p,t 
           Note: α’p, t = abnormal returns, β’= volatility coefficient, *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
.  
 α’p, t T-statistics β’ p, t T-statistics 
Industry Group 
Lodging Acquirers 2.75%       3.00*** 0.90 7.11*** 
REITs Acquirers -0.66% -1.31 0.76 8.15*** 
Payment Method 
Cash Payment 1.28% 1.57 0.81 6.19*** 
Stock Payment 1.36% 1.64 0.93 7.74*** 
All Acquirers  1.30%    2.26** 0.87 9.89*** 
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Payment Methods and Abnormal Return 
 
Table 4. 
 
T-TEST FOR ABNORMAL RETURNS OF CASH AND STOCK OFFERS 
 
PAYMENT                      N.                 Mean       Std. Deviation     Std. Error Mean 
ALPHA CASH ALPHA                 11                    .012             .050                       .015 
 STOCK ALPHA                9                    .009              .034                       .011 
 
 
 
In analysis of hypothesis 2, independent T-test is applied between cash offer 
alphas and stock offer alphas to study whether there are significant differences associated 
with payment methods. The result is shown in Table 4. The mean of cash offer abnormal 
return is 1.2% and for stock offer abnormal return is 0.9%. Statistical difference between 
the different payment method is 0.003 (p=.862). The results are much weaker. The 
positive and insignificant difference indicates that cash offer and stock offer acquirers do 
not generate significantly different abnormal returns in the long term. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 is not supported. The result differed from Slovin (1987) and Travlos (1987) 
in which equity financing generated significant different gains from the cash financing.  
The Impact of Payment Methods and Merger Size on Percentage Excess Return 
 
 
Previous studies found both relative and absolute merger size important indicators 
for studying merger and acquisition gains and losses (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983 
and 1986). This study suggests that only absolute merger size has statistical importance. 
The results of regression analysis of the relation between the dependent variable (long 
term percentage excess return) and two independent variables (the absolute merger size 
and payment methods) are reported in Table 5, 6, 7, and 8. The results are grouped in 
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three, six, nine, and twelve months post merger. The sectioning aims to study the trend of 
the impact of the both independent variables on dependent variable in different time 
frames.  
The Three Months Results 
 
 
Table 5  
 
THREE MONTHS IMPACT OF PAYMENT METHODS AND  
ABSOLUTE MERGER SIZE  
(R p, t – R f, t) = β’ 0 - β’1 Mervalp  - β’2D + ε’ 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Multiple R                      0.622    
Multiple R Square                 0.387    
Adjusted R Square                 0.305    
Standard error of the estimate      0.063    
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 0.038  2  0.019  4.732  0.026  
Residual 0.060  15  0.004    
Total 0.097  17    
Variables in the Equation 
Variables in the 
Equation  B Std.Error Beta T Sig. 
Constant 0.110  0.028   3.917 0.001 
Payment -0.084  0.033  -0.574 -2.534 0.023 
Absolute Size -2.06E-011 0.000  -0.612 -2.701 0.016 
 
 
Summary.  The regression equation characteristics of percentage stock excess 
return at three months indicates a reasonable adjusted R2 of 0.30. It suggests that 30% of 
the variation in the percentage excess return is explained by the equation. The F value of 
4.732 with significance level less than 0.05 shows that the model is applicable.  
 The model tests whether two independent variables have significant impact on the 
dependent variable predicating the performance of acquirers three months post merger.  
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Cash payment is coded as 1 and stock as 0. Both independent variables emerge as 
significant (T<0.05) in the model as follows: 
(R p, t – R f, t) = 0.11 - 2.06E - 011Mervalp - 0.084D 
where,  
R p, t – R f, t = the percentage excess return for company p in month t,  
Mervalp = the announced value of merger,   
D =
 
the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if cash is the only announced financing 
and 0 if common stock is the only announced financing, 
 The negative sign of cash and absolute size indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between the two independent variables (cash payment and absolute size) and 
the percentage excess return for acquirers at three months post merger.  
Payment Impact.  Cash is coded as 1 and the model shows a negative sign for 
payment method. The negative coefficient -0.084 projects that merger deals equal in size 
but financing differently with stock would result in different percentage excess returns. 
More specially, stock financing would generate 11% excess returns for acquirers as 
compared to 2.6% with cash financing. Ultimately cash financing would cause a loss of 
8.4% of returns three months post merger if the same acquirer opts against stock 
financing.  
Absolute Size Impact. With regard to market equity value, REITs companies vary 
from 2 to 5 billion, large hotel from 5 to 10 billion, and small hotel are often less than 1 
billion. The negative impact of absolute size on the dependent variable percentage of 
excess return is understandably minimal.  
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 The negative sign of absolute size indicates a negative relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable. Yet the impact is comparatively marginal three 
month post merger.  
 
The Six Months Results 
 
 
Table 6  
 
SIX MONTHS IMPACT OF PAYMENT METHODS AND  
ABSOLUTE MERGER SIZE 
(R p, t – R f, t) = β’ 0 - β’1 Mervalp  - β’2D + ε’ 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Multiple R 0.606    
Multiple R Square 0.367    
Adjusted R Square 0.282    
Standard error of the estimate 0.028    
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 0.007 2 0.003 4.346 0.032 
Residual 0.012 15 0.001   
Total 0.019 17    
Variables in the Equation 
Variables in the 
Equation  B Std.Error Beta T Sig. 
Constant 0.047  0.013   3.754 0.002 
Payment -0.043  0.015  -0.660 -2.865 0.012 
Absolute Size -6.57E-012 0.000 -0.441 -1.916 0.075 
 
Summary. The regression equation characteristics of percentage stock excess 
return at six months indicates a reasonable adjusted R2 of 0.28. It suggests that 28% of 
the variation in the percentage excess return is explained by the equation. The F value of 
4. 346 with significance level less than 0.05 shows that the model is applicable.  
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 The model tests whether two independent variables have significant impact on the 
dependent variable predicating the performance of acquirers six months post merger.  
Both independent variables emerge as significant (T<0.1) in the model as follows: 
(R p, t – R f, t) = 0.047 - 6.57E - 012Mervalp - 0.043D 
where,  
R p, t – R f, t = the percentage excess return for company p in month t,  
Mervalp = the announced value of merger,   
D =
 
the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if cash is the only announced financing 
and 0 if common stock is the only announced financing, 
 The negative sign of both cash and absolute size indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between the two independent variables (cash payment and absolute size) and 
the percentage excess return for acquirers at six months post merger.  
Payment Impact. Similar to the results three months post merger, the negative 
coefficient -0.043 predicts that merger deals equal in size but financing differently with 
stock would result in different percentage excess returns. More specially, stock financing 
would generate 4.7% returns for acquirers as compared to 0.4% with cash financing. 
Ultimately cash financing would cause a loss of 4.3% of returns six months post merger 
if the same acquirer votes against stock financing.  
Absolute Size Impact. Compared to three months post merger, the negative 
impact of absolute size on the dependent variable percentage of excess return is smaller 
six months post merger. The negative sign of absolute size indicates a negative 
relationship between the dependent and independent variable. Yet the overall impact of -
6.57E-012 is considerably small.   
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The Nine Months Results 
 
 
Table 7  
 
NINE MONTHS IMPACT OF PAYMENT METHODS AND  
ABSOLUTE MERGER SIZE 
(R p, t – R f, t) = β’ 0 - β’1 Mervalp  - β’2D + ε’ 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Multiple R 0.511    
Multiple R Square 0.262    
Adjusted R Square 0.163    
Standard error of the estimate 0.029    
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 0.005 2 0.002 2.657 0.10 
Residual 0.013 15 0.001   
Total 0.017 17    
Variables in the Equation 
Variables in the 
Equation B Std.Error Beta T Sig. 
Constant 0.044 0.013  3.403 0.004 
Payment -0.035 0.015 -0.569 -2.289 0.037 
Absolute Size -4.50E-011 0.000 -0.317 -1.275 0.222 
 
Summary. The regression equation characteristics of percentage stock excess 
return at nine months indicates adjusted R2 of 0.16. It suggests that 16% of the variation 
in the percentage excess return is explained by the equation. The F value of 2.7 with 
significance level at 0.1 shows that the model is applicable.  
 The model tests whether two independent variables have significant impact on the 
dependent variable predicating the performance of acquirers nine months post merger.  
Payment is found to be significantly (T<0.05) related with excess return. The model 
writes as follows: 
(R p, t – R f, t) = 0.044 - 0.035D 
where,  
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R p, t – R f, t = the percentage excess return for company p in month t,  
D =
 
the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if cash is the only announced financing 
and 0 if common stock is the only announced financing, 
 The negative sign of cash indicates that there is a negative relationship between 
cash payment and the percentage excess return for acquirers at nine months post merger.  
Payment Impact. Consistent with three and six months post merger, the negative 
coefficient (-0.035) projects that merger deals equal in size but financing differently with 
stock would result in different percentage excess returns. More specially, stock financing 
would generate 4.4% returns for acquirers as compared to 0.9% with cash financing. 
Ultimately cash financing would cause a loss of 3.5% of returns nine months post merger 
if the same acquirer opts against stock financing.  
Absolute Size Impact. The negative sign of absolute size indicates a negative 
relationship between the dependent and independent variable. However, the coefficient is 
not statistically significant.  
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The Twelve Months Results 
 
 
Table 8  
 
TWELVEM MONTHS IMPACT OF PAYMENT METHODS AND  
ABSOLUTE MERGER SIZE  
(R p, t – R f, t) = β’ 0 - β’1 Mervalp  - β’2D + ε’ 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Multiple R 0.367    
Multiple R Square 0.134    
Adjusted R Square 0.019    
Standard error of the estimate 0.214    
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 0.001 2 0.001 1.165 0.339 
Residual 0.007 15 0.000   
Total 0.008 17    
Variables in the Equation 
Variables in the 
Equation B Std.Error Beta T Sig. 
Constant 0.021 0.010  2.180 0.046 
Payment -0.017 0.011 -0.406 -1.509 0.152 
Absolute Size -2.29E-012 0.000 -0.239 -0.886 0.389 
 
Summary. The regression equation characteristics of percentage stock excess 
return at twelve months indicates adjusted R2 of 0.019. It suggests that only 1.9% of the 
variation in the percentage excess return is explained by the equation. The F value of 
1.165 with shows that the data overall does not support the model.  
Overall Trend of the Impact on Percentage Excess Returns 
 
 
In general, the study identifies a significant association between excess returns 
and payment methods and absolute merger size at three, six, and nine months post 
merger.  The model (4) fits the data well and the results generally support hypothesis 
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3(b). The coefficients of Betas represent the impact of the independent variables on the 
percentage excess returns of acquirers.  More specifically, when comparing the Betas 
among all four different time frames, the impact of absolute size (-0.612) is greater than 
that of payment methods (-0.574) in the relatively shorter term of three months. Yet the 
differences become reversed in the longer term.  
Second, the negative impact of cash payment on hospitality acquirers decreases 
with time while the impact significance level dwindles as well. The negative impact of 
cash payment at three months is -0.574 (T=-2.534) as compared to that of twelve months 
at -0.406 (-1.509).   
Third, stock payment offers yield relatively greater percentage returns to acquirers 
than cash payment offers with equal size control. Yet the differences decrease with time 
as well. After three months post merger, the differences closes from 8.4% to 4.3%, to 
3.5% at nine months post merger.   
The results of the negative impact of cash offers are identifiable with the recent 
study of Slovin and others (2005) while challenge previous views on the positive impact 
of cash payment (Harris and Mayer, 1988, etc.).  
Finally, the study discovers the important effect of absolute merger size on the 
excess percentage return and less significant effect of relative merger size. The results 
were in partial agreement with Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983 and 1986) in which 
both forms of size were found relevant. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The value-maximization behaviors of acquiring firms suggest that merger and 
acquisition activities create synergy for the acquired and acquiring firms. Previous studies 
(Hsu and Jang, 2006) selected the S& P 500 index as the benchmark portfolio and found 
that neither in the long-term equity performance nor in the short-term accounting 
measures did acquiring lodging companies gain from the mergers from 1985 to 2000.  
This study incorporated sector indices. It is believed that the sector indices offered a more 
appropriate measure for the abnormal gains since the indices helped isolate the impact 
from the volatilities of the hospitality industry as a whole.  This study found significant 
positive gains for the acquiring hospitality firms in the long term using industry indices 
from 1996 to 2007.  The result supports the study of Canina (2001).  
Previous payment studies on merger and acquisition have lead to mixed findings 
based on conflicting payment theories in general disciplines.  The study found that cash 
offer acquirers and stock offer acquirers did not produce significantly different abnormal 
returns on equity for hospitality acquirers.  This study attempted to control the size of 
merger and acquisition and the type of payment to study the impact on acquirers’ excess 
return on equity.  Absolute size was found to have significant impact on the excess 
returns of hospitality acquirers.  The study also found the negative impact of cash offer 
more obvious closer to the merger announcement than in the long term of 12 months. 
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Stock offers, on the other hand, were more preferable to acquirers’ equity value 
overall.  In addition, the significant negative impact of cash financing decreased greatly 
three months after merger and acquisition and its negative impact became negligible 
twelve months later.  
It’s a challenge to develop a theoretical model effectively testing the validities of 
the three theories of payment methods. The study on payment methods in merger and 
acquisition also involves complex data collection and filtering process. Some acquirers 
later became target companies. The role switch restricted access to their market values 
and stock performances twelve months or longer after the merger announcement. Other 
acquirers turn into private entities shortly after the period of interest in this study and 
their financial information were no longer available to the public. The mix of payment 
methods for many acquirers greatly limits the list of study.  
Despite conflicting empirical studies (e.g., Canina, 2001; Sheel and Nagpal, 2000; 
Hsu and Jang, 2006; Yang and Kim, 2007), the hospitality industry continues to witness 
more firms diversifying their portfolios through merger and acquisition activities.  One 
possible explanation is that the industry itself generally outperforms the general market, 
thus shareholders support management decisions to obtain greater market shares. 
Hospitality acquirers are striving to adjust to the highly saturated market, post merger 
management problems, and the higher volatilities of the industry to the broad market.  
Ultimately, hospitality top management needs to take into consideration that the goal is to 
maximize shareholders’ value.  
 Future studies can conduct a comprehensive comparison among different models 
measuring abnormal returns such as buy-and-hold (Barber and Lyons, 1997) and Fama-
 40 
French factors (Fama and French, 1993). Different results derived by different models 
can be studied. Given the fluctuations on the general stock market and the industry-
sensitive volatilities, future studies can also explore and categorize the differences of 
abnormal returns in event time and also in different industry sectors. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1.  
 
Studied Merger List & Merger Value 
 
Acquirer Name 
Announced 
Total Value 
(mil.) 
Acquirer 
Market Value 
(mil.) 
STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS 345 1,531 
FELCOR LODGING TRUST INC 200 633 
HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST 453 3,859 
LASALLE HOTEL PROPERTIES 215 1,600 
LA QUINTA CORP-PAIRED 412 1,616 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL-CL A 1,452 12,542 
MORGANS HOTEL GROUP CO 770 633 
SUNSTONE HOTEL INVESTORS INC 243 1,723 
STATION CASINOS INC 232 4,323 
HOST HOTELS & RESORTS INC 3,324 10,814 
BOYD GAMING CORP 1,284 2,431 
HARRAH'S ENTERTAINMENT INC 9,380 13,969 
HILTON HOTELS CORP 3,963 4,017 
PATRIOT AMER HOSPITALITY INC 289 5,899 
MGM MIRAGE 522 2,811 
HARRAH'S ENTERTAINMENT INC 743 2,992 
FELCOR LODGING TRUST INC 1,703 1,773 
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT INC 850 1,500 
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Appendix 2. 
 
Acquirer historical stock price (Px), stock return (Rpt), stock excess return (Rpt-Rft), 
market indices return (Rmt), & market indices excess return (Rmt-Rpt) 
 
Appendix 2.1  
 
Ameristar Casinos Inc (ASCA) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
12/29/2000 2.56     
1/31/2001 3.13 21.95% 9.84% 21.40% 9.29% 
2/28/2001 3.19 2.00% -8.52% 1.54% -8.99% 
3/30/2001 3.26 2.21% -3.08% 1.77% -3.51% 
4/30/2001 4.25 30.46% 7.82% 30.03% 7.39% 
5/31/2001 6.32 48.71% 4.33% 48.34% 3.96% 
6/29/2001 8.00 26.58% -0.56% 26.24% -0.90% 
7/31/2001 8.83 10.31% 0.33% 9.99% 0.00% 
8/31/2001 7.71 -12.63% -3.77% -12.95% -4.08% 
9/28/2001 6.52 -15.50% -26.88% -15.80% -27.18% 
10/31/2001 8.59 31.85% -1.85% 31.63% -2.07% 
11/30/2001 11.90 38.53% 16.94% 38.34% 16.75% 
12/31/2001 12.53 5.25% 9.04% 5.08% 8.86% 
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Appendix 2.2 
 
 Strategic Hotels and Resorts (BEE) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
9/29/2006 19.88     
10/31/2006 21.27 6.99% 1.60% 6.55% 1.15% 
11/30/2006 21.75 2.26% 5.17% 1.81% 4.73% 
12/29/2006 21.79 0.18% -2.15% -0.26% -2.60% 
1/31/2007 21.52 -1.24% 5.27% -1.68% 4.82% 
2/28/2007 21.00 -2.42% -1.11% -2.86% -1.56% 
3/30/2007 22.87 8.90% 1.91% 8.46% 1.47% 
4/30/2007 21.65 -5.33% -1.07% -5.78% -1.51% 
5/31/2007 23.32 7.71% 1.76% 7.27% 1.32% 
6/29/2007 22.49 -3.56% -6.02% -4.00% -6.47% 
7/31/2007 21.28 -5.38% -8.83% -5.82% -9.28% 
8/31/2007 20.57 -3.34% 2.44% -3.78% 2.00% 
9/28/2007 20.59 0.10% -0.74% -0.38% -1.22% 
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Appendix 2.3  
 
Boyd Gaming Corp (BYD) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rft Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
7/30/2004 26.29     
8/31/2004 27.15 3.27% 0.02% 3.15% -0.10% 
9/30/2004 28.15 3.68% 8.85% 3.54% 8.72% 
10/29/2004 33.49 18.97% 6.36% 18.82% 6.21% 
11/30/2004 36.76 9.76% 5.86% 9.60% 5.69% 
12/31/2004 41.65 13.30% 10.90% 13.11% 10.71% 
1/31/2005 39.80 -4.44% -1.58% -4.64% -1.78% 
2/28/2005 49.01 23.14% 2.95% 22.92% 2.74% 
3/31/2005 52.15 6.41% 0.22% 6.18% 0.00% 
4/29/2005 52.78 1.21% -6.65% 0.97% -6.89% 
5/31/2005 52.86 0.15% 4.76% -0.11% 4.50% 
6/30/2005 51.13 -3.27% -5.80% -3.53% -6.06% 
7/29/2005 52.44 2.56% 7.12% 2.28% 6.84% 
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Appendix 2.4 
 
 Felcor Lodging Trust Inc (FCH) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
6/30/1997 37.25     
7/31/1997 39.00 4.70% 3.90% 4.22% 3.42% 
8/29/1997 38.00 -2.56% -0.91% -3.03% -1.38% 
9/30/1997 41.06 8.06% 15.67% 7.59% 15.20% 
10/31/1997 36.63 -10.81% 0.52% -11.28% 0.05% 
11/28/1997 36.31 -0.85% -9.13% -1.32% -9.60% 
12/31/1997 35.50 -2.24% 3.71% -2.73% 3.21% 
1/30/1998 37.38 5.28% -2.38% 4.81% -2.85% 
2/27/1998 35.88 -4.01% 1.75% -4.48% 1.28% 
3/31/1998 37.06 3.31% -1.84% 2.84% -2.31% 
4/30/1998 35.00 -5.56% -5.63% -6.04% -6.10% 
5/29/1998 34.44 -1.61% -5.36% -2.08% -5.83% 
6/30/1998 31.38 -8.89% -0.25% -9.36% -0.72% 
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Appendix 2.5 
 
 Harrah’s Entertainment Inc (HET) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
6/30/2005 72.07     
7/29/2005 78.74 9.25% 7.12% 8.98% 6.84% 
8/31/2005 69.56 -11.66% -9.20% -11.95% -9.49% 
9/30/2005 65.19 -6.28% -2.33% -6.59% -2.64% 
10/31/2005 60.48 -7.23% -5.36% -7.55% -5.68% 
11/30/2005 68.09 12.58% 12.09% 12.24% 11.75% 
12/30/2005 71.29 4.70% 1.30% 4.34% 0.95% 
1/31/2006 73.60 3.24% 6.90% 2.87% 6.53% 
2/28/2006 71.92 -2.28% 0.65% -2.66% 0.27% 
3/31/2006 77.96 8.40% 8.23% 8.01% 7.84% 
4/28/2006 81.64 4.72% 5.83% 4.32% 5.43% 
5/31/2006 76.04 -6.86% -0.97% -7.28% -1.39% 
6/30/2006 71.18 -6.39% 2.22% -6.82% 1.79% 
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Appendix 2.6 
 
 Hilton Hotels Corp (HLY) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
12/31/1999 9.56     
1/31/2000 8.44 -11.76% -2.92% -12.25% -3.41% 
2/29/2000 7.00 -17.04% -8.80% -17.53% -9.29% 
3/31/2000 7.75 10.71% 10.49% 10.22% 10.00% 
4/28/2000 8.44 8.87% 11.11% 8.36% 10.60% 
5/31/2000 8.50 0.74% 6.40% 0.22% 5.87% 
6/30/2000 9.38 10.29% 3.58% 9.74% 3.03% 
7/31/2000 10.25 9.33% 9.24% 8.78% 8.68% 
8/31/2000 10.02 -2.25% -1.38% -2.80% -1.93% 
9/29/2000 11.81 17.89% -2.44% 17.34% -3.00% 
10/31/2000 9.50 -19.58% 1.51% -20.13% 0.96% 
11/30/2000 9.38 -1.32% 3.35% -1.87% 2.80% 
12/29/2000 10.50 12.00% 5.72% 11.43% 5.16% 
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Appendix 2.7 
 
 Hospitality Properties Trust (HPT) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
2/28/2005 38.93     
3/31/2005 37.91 -2.63% -0.09% -2.85% -0.32% 
4/29/2005 39.22 3.47% 1.63% 3.23% 1.39% 
5/31/2005 41.23 5.12% 3.20% 4.86% 2.95% 
6/30/2005 41.37 0.34% 4.21% 0.08% 3.95% 
7/29/2005 41.68 0.75% 5.03% 0.47% 4.75% 
8/31/2005 40.70 -2.34% -3.76% -2.64% -4.06% 
9/30/2005 40.23 -1.15% -2.09% -1.46% -2.40% 
10/31/2005 37.27 -7.37% -2.94% -7.69% -3.26% 
11/30/2005 38.67 3.75% 5.82% 3.41% 5.48% 
12/30/2005 37.64 -2.65% 2.39% -3.00% 2.03% 
1/31/2006 40.24 6.91% 7.62% 6.54% 7.26% 
2/28/2006 41.77 3.80% -0.12% 3.42% -0.50% 
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Appendix 2.8  
 
Host Hotels & Resorts Inc (HST) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
4/28/2006 21.02     
5/31/2006 20.07 -4.52% -3.24% -4.94% -3.66% 
6/30/2006 21.87 8.97% 6.77% 8.54% 6.35% 
7/31/2006 21.22 -2.97% -2.56% -3.42% -3.00% 
8/31/2006 22.54 6.22% 4.27% 5.77% 3.82% 
9/29/2006 22.93 1.73% 0.27% 1.29% -0.17% 
10/31/2006 23.06 0.57% 1.60% 0.12% 1.15% 
11/30/2006 25.22 9.37% 5.17% 8.92% 4.73% 
12/29/2006 24.55 -2.66% -2.15% -3.10% -2.60% 
1/31/2007 26.47 7.82% 5.27% 7.38% 4.82% 
2/28/2007 26.28 -0.72% -1.11% -1.16% -1.56% 
3/30/2007 26.31 0.11% 1.91% -0.33% 1.47% 
4/30/2007 25.64 -2.55% -1.07% -2.99% -1.51% 
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Appendix 2.9  
 
Lasalle Hotel Properties (LHO) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
3/31/2006 41.00     
4/28/2006 43.73 6.66% -1.02% 6.26% -1.42% 
5/31/2006 41.53 -5.03% -3.24% -5.45% -3.66% 
6/30/2006 46.30 11.49% 6.77% 11.06% 6.35% 
7/31/2006 41.31 -10.78% -2.56% -11.22% -3.00% 
8/31/2006 43.94 6.37% 4.27% 5.92% 3.82% 
9/29/2006 43.34 -1.37% 0.27% -1.81% -0.17% 
10/31/2006 42.25 -2.51% 1.60% -2.96% 1.15% 
11/30/2006 44.10 4.38% 5.17% 3.94% 4.73% 
12/29/2006 45.85 3.97% -2.15% 3.52% -2.60% 
1/31/2007 47.61 3.84% 5.27% 3.40% 4.82% 
2/28/2007 44.43 -6.68% -1.11% -7.12% -1.56% 
3/30/2007 46.36 4.34% 1.91% 3.90% 1.47% 
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Appendix 2.10  
 
La Quita Corp-Paired (LQI) 
 
Date Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft 
9/30/2004 9/30/2004 7.80    
10/29/2004 10/29/2004 8.05 3.21% -22.29% 3.05% 
11/30/2004 11/30/2004 8.05 0.00% -17.74% -0.17% 
12/31/2004 12/31/2004 9.09 12.92% -8.78% 12.73% 
1/31/2005 1/31/2005 8.69 -4.40% -10.21% -4.60% 
2/28/2005 2/28/2005 9.25 6.44% -7.56% 6.23% 
3/31/2005 3/31/2005 8.50 -8.11% -7.36% -8.33% 
4/29/2005 4/29/2005 8.70 2.35% -13.51% 2.11% 
5/31/2005 5/31/2005 8.67 -0.34% -9.40% -0.60% 
6/30/2005 6/30/2005 9.33 7.61% -14.66% 7.35% 
7/29/2005 7/29/2005 9.00 -3.54% -8.58% -3.82% 
8/31/2005 8/31/2005 8.45 -6.11% -16.99% -6.40% 
9/30/2005 9/30/2005 8.69 2.84% -18.93% 2.53% 
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Marriott International-CL A (MAR)  
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
6/30/2005 34.11     
7/29/2005 34.24 0.37% 7.12% 0.09% 6.84% 
8/31/2005 31.61 -7.68% -9.20% -7.98% -9.49% 
9/30/2005 31.50 -0.33% -2.33% -0.64% -2.64% 
10/31/2005 29.81 -5.37% -5.36% -5.69% -5.68% 
11/30/2005 32.31 8.37% 12.09% 8.03% 11.75% 
12/30/2005 33.49 3.65% 1.30% 3.29% 0.95% 
1/31/2006 33.32 -0.49% 6.90% -0.86% 6.53% 
2/28/2006 34.20 2.64% 0.65% 2.26% 0.27% 
3/31/2006 34.30 0.29% 8.23% -0.09% 7.84% 
4/28/2006 36.54 6.52% 5.83% 6.11% 5.43% 
5/31/2006 36.17 -1.01% -0.97% -1.43% -1.39% 
6/30/2006 38.12 5.41% 2.22% 4.98% 1.79% 
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Appendix 2.12  
 
Morgans Hotels Group Co (MHGC) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
2/28/2007 17.46     
3/30/2007 21.01 20.33% -0.12% 19.89% -0.57% 
4/30/2007 22.15 5.43% -1.40% 4.98% -1.85% 
5/31/2007 24.58 10.97% 2.39% 10.53% 1.94% 
6/29/2007 24.38 -0.81% -2.43% -1.26% -2.87% 
7/31/2007 19.29 -20.88% 1.71% -21.32% 1.27% 
8/31/2007 19.28 -0.05% 7.58% -0.50% 7.14% 
9/28/2007 21.75 12.81% 10.95% 12.33% 10.47% 
10/31/2007 22.76 4.64% 0.53% 4.22% 0.10% 
11/30/2007 18.49 -18.76% -10.03% -19.15% -10.42% 
12/31/2007 19.28 4.27% -8.02% 3.84% -8.46% 
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Appendix 2.13  
 
Patriot Amer Hospitality Inc (PAH) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
7/31/1997 24.92     
8/29/1997 24.36 -2.26% -0.91% -2.72% -1.38% 
9/30/1997 31.85 30.77% 15.67% 30.30% 15.20% 
10/31/1997 32.98 3.53% 0.52% 3.06% 0.05% 
11/28/1997 31.23 -5.30% -9.13% -5.77% -9.60% 
12/31/1997 28.80 -7.80% 3.71% -8.30% 3.21% 
1/30/1998 25.61 -11.06% -2.38% -11.54% -2.85% 
2/27/1998 24.98 -2.44% 1.75% -2.91% 1.28% 
3/31/1998 26.98 8.00% -1.84% 7.53% -2.31% 
4/30/1998 25.23 -6.48% -5.63% -6.96% -6.10% 
5/29/1998 23.92 -5.20% -5.36% -5.67% -5.83% 
6/30/1998 23.92 0.00% -0.25% -0.47% -0.72% 
7/31/1998 18.99 -20.63% -14.39% -21.10% -14.86% 
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Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc (SHO) 
  
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
3/31/2006 28.97     
4/28/2006 28.74 -0.00794 -0.01021 -0.01196 -0.01423 
5/31/2006 27.7 -0.03619 -0.03235 -0.04039 -0.03655 
6/30/2006 29.06 0.049097 0.067727 0.044839 0.063468 
7/31/2006 28.36 -0.02409 -0.0256 -0.02853 -0.03004 
8/31/2006 29.9 0.054302 0.04271 0.04981 0.038217 
9/29/2006 29.72 -0.00602 0.002694 -0.01046 -0.00175 
10/31/2006 29.46 -0.00875 0.015961 -0.01318 0.011526 
11/30/2006 27.88 -0.05363 0.051719 -0.05807 0.047285 
12/29/2006 26.73 -0.04125 -0.02152 -0.04571 -0.02598 
1/31/2007 28.29 0.058361 0.052675 0.053926 0.04824 
2/28/2007 28.34 0.001767 -0.01113 -0.00267 -0.01556 
3/30/2007 27.26 -0.03811 0.019094 -0.04254 0.014661 
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 Station Casinos Inc (STN) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
4/28/2006 77.08     
5/31/2006 73.00 -5.29% -0.97% -5.71% -1.39% 
6/30/2006 68.08 -6.74% 2.22% -7.17% 1.79% 
7/31/2006 54.86 -19.42% -14.75% -19.86% -15.19% 
8/31/2006 58.25 6.18% 7.34% 5.73% 6.89% 
9/29/2006 57.83 -0.72% 2.42% -1.17% 1.98% 
10/31/2006 60.30 4.27% 8.25% 3.83% 7.81% 
11/30/2006 68.04 12.84% 14.62% 12.39% 14.18% 
12/29/2006 81.67 20.03% 3.82% 19.59% 3.37% 
1/31/2007 83.20 1.87% 9.37% 1.43% 8.93% 
2/28/2007 86.29 3.71% -4.57% 3.27% -5.01% 
3/30/2007 86.57 0.32% -0.12% -0.12% -0.57% 
4/30/2007 87.00 0.50% -1.40% 0.05% -1.85% 
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MGM Mirage (MGM) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
3/31/1999 8.41     
4/30/1999 11.00 30.85% 17.97% 30.44% 17.56% 
5/31/1999 10.50 -4.55% -10.46% -4.95% -10.87% 
6/30/1999 12.25 16.67% 2.20% 16.25% 1.79% 
7/30/1999 11.30 -7.78% -9.04% -8.22% -9.48% 
8/31/1999 12.28 8.71% -4.81% 8.28% -5.24% 
9/30/1999 12.78 4.07% -4.35% 3.62% -4.80% 
10/29/1999 12.75 -0.24% 0.42% -0.69% -0.03% 
11/30/1999 12.34 -3.19% -2.34% -3.64% -2.79% 
12/31/1999 12.58 1.90% -0.47% 1.36% -1.01% 
1/31/2000 10.34 -17.76% -2.92% -18.25% -3.41% 
2/29/2000 9.94 -3.93% -8.80% -4.42% -9.29% 
3/31/2000 12.00 20.75% 10.49% 20.26% 10.00% 
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Appendix 2.17 
 
 Harrah’s Entertainment Inc (HET) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
1/29/1999 14.88     
2/26/1999 16.69 12.18% 9.16% 11.77% 8.75% 
3/31/1999 19.06 14.23% -5.10% 13.82% -5.51% 
4/30/1999 22.00 15.41% 17.97% 15.00% 17.56% 
5/31/1999 21.63 -1.70% -10.46% -2.11% -10.87% 
6/30/1999 22.06 2.02% 2.20% 1.61% 1.79% 
7/30/1999 21.31 -3.40% -9.04% -3.84% -9.48% 
8/31/1999 22.50 5.57% -4.81% 5.14% -5.24% 
9/30/1999 27.75 23.33% -4.35% 22.89% -4.80% 
10/29/1999 28.94 4.28% 0.42% 3.83% -0.03% 
11/30/1999 27.63 -4.54% -2.34% -4.99% -2.79% 
12/31/1999 26.44 -4.30% -0.47% -4.84% -1.01% 
1/31/2000 19.94 -24.59% -2.92% -25.07% -3.41% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63 
Appendix 2.18 
 
 Caesars Entertainment Inc (CZR) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
1/29/1999 6.88     
2/26/1999 7.50 9.09% 9.16% 8.68% 8.75% 
3/31/1999 7.56 0.83% -5.10% 0.42% -5.51% 
4/30/1999 10.81 42.98% 17.97% 42.56% 17.56% 
5/31/1999 10.50 -2.89% -10.46% -3.30% -10.87% 
6/30/1999 9.56 -8.97% 2.20% -9.38% 1.79% 
7/30/1999 10.19 6.58% -9.04% 6.14% -9.48% 
8/31/1999 11.50 12.88% -4.81% 12.45% -5.24% 
9/30/1999 12.50 8.70% -4.35% 8.25% -4.80% 
10/29/1999 13.13 5.00% 0.42% 4.55% -0.03% 
11/30/1999 12.88 -1.90% -2.34% -2.36% -2.79% 
12/31/1999 12.50 -2.91% -0.47% -3.45% -1.01% 
1/31/2000 10.50 -16.00% -2.92% -16.49% -3.41% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
Appendix 2.19  
 
Felcor Lodging Trust Inc (FCH) 
 
Date Px Last Rpt Rmt Rpt-Rft Rmt-Rft 
12/31/1998 23.00     
1/29/1999 21.81 -5.16% 9.44% -5.59% 9.02% 
2/26/1999 23.63 8.31% 9.16% 7.90% 8.75% 
3/31/1999 23.19 -1.85% -5.10% -2.27% -5.51% 
4/30/1999 23.94 3.23% 17.97% 2.82% 17.56% 
5/31/1999 22.69 -5.22% -10.46% -5.63% -10.87% 
6/30/1999 20.75 -8.54% 2.20% -8.95% 1.79% 
7/30/1999 19.50 -6.02% -9.04% -6.46% -9.48% 
8/31/1999 17.94 -8.01% -4.81% -8.45% -5.24% 
9/30/1999 17.50 -2.44% -4.35% -2.89% -4.80% 
10/29/1999 17.00 -2.86% 0.42% -3.31% -0.03% 
11/30/1999 17.00 0.00% -2.34% -0.45% -2.79% 
12/31/1999 17.50 2.94% -0.47% 2.40% -1.01% 
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Appendix 3. 
 
 Lodging-industry Merger and Acquisition Trend 1982 to 2000 
(in millions) 
 
Private Sectors Public Sector  
Year No. of M & A Total Value N0. of M& A Total Value 
1982 0 $ 0 1 $152.4 
1983 1 286.3 1 137.4 
1984 0 0 2 316.0 
1985 0 0 3 460.3 
1986 0 0 2 1,065.0 
1987 0 0 0 0 
1988 2 11.6 2 39.1 
1989 0 0 1 55.5 
1990 1 48.4 0 0 
1991 0 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 1 4.8 
1993 2 29.7 0 0 
1994 3 199.9 2 80.2 
1995 1 2.5 4 193.9 
1996 1 1.5 3 4,934.5 
1997 0 0 7 15,559.6 
1998 1 1.4 10 25,011.7 
1999 3 3,734 2 1,093.0 
2000 1 428.3 N/A N/A 
Source: Canina (2001). 
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Appendix 4. 
 
 Indices Comparison 1999-2007 
 
Date Lodging REITs S&P 500 Lodging REITs S & P 500 
 Px Last Px Last Px Last Px Last Px Last Px Last 
1/29/1999 100.00 100.00 100.00 109.44 79.26 1279.64 
2/26/1999 109.16 97.94 96.77 119.47 77.63 1238.33 
3/31/1999 103.60 97.40 100.53 113.38 77.20 1286.37 
4/30/1999 122.22 109.49 104.34 133.76 86.78 1335.18 
5/31/1999 109.44 105.51 101.73 119.77 83.63 1301.84 
6/30/1999 111.85 100.81 107.27 122.41 79.90 1372.71 
7/30/1999 101.74 93.43 103.84 111.34 74.05 1328.72 
8/31/1999 96.85 87.35 103.19 105.99 69.23 1320.41 
9/30/1999 92.64 82.65 100.24 101.38 65.51 1282.71 
10/29/1999 93.03 80.71 106.51 101.81 63.97 1362.93 
11/30/1999 90.85 78.73 108.54 99.43 62.40 1388.91 
12/31/1999 90.42 76.41 114.82 98.96 60.56 1469.25 
1/31/2000 87.78 79.60 108.97 96.07 63.09 1394.46 
2/29/2000 80.06 77.86 106.78 87.62 61.71 1366.42 
3/31/2000 88.46 80.24 117.11 96.81 63.60 1498.58 
4/28/2000 98.29 90.65 113.50 107.57 71.85 1452.43 
5/31/2000 104.58 88.82 111.02 114.45 70.40 1420.60 
6/30/2000 108.32 88.33 113.67 118.55 70.01 1454.60 
7/31/2000 118.33 98.03 111.82 129.50 77.70 1430.83 
8/31/2000 116.69 95.14 118.60 127.71 75.41 1517.68 
9/29/2000 113.84 96.61 112.26 124.59 76.57 1436.51 
10/31/2000 115.56 91.21 111.70 126.47 72.29 1429.40 
11/30/2000 119.44 93.89 102.76 130.71 74.42 1314.95 
12/29/2000 126.27 100.16 103.18 138.19 79.39 1320.28 
1/31/2001 138.70 107.49 106.75 151.79 85.20 1366.01 
2/28/2001 126.87 103.90 96.90 138.85 82.35 1239.94 
3/30/2001 122.97 101.16 90.68 134.58 80.18 1160.33 
4/30/2001 132.58 103.67 97.64 145.10 82.17 1249.46 
5/31/2001 138.32 109.34 98.14 151.38 86.66 1255.82 
6/29/2001 137.55 110.17 95.68 150.53 87.32 1224.42 
7/31/2001 137.99 106.02 94.65 151.02 84.03 1211.23 
8/31/2001 132.79 105.30 88.59 145.33 83.46 1133.58 
9/28/2001 97.10 69.15 81.35 106.27 54.81 1040.94 
10/31/2001 95.30 67.32 82.82 104.30 53.36 1059.78 
11/30/2001 111.45 79.51 89.04 121.97 63.02 1139.45 
12/31/2001 121.52 83.48 89.72 132.99 66.17 1148.08 
1/31/2002 127.05 88.86 88.32 139.04 70.43 1130.20 
2/28/2002 128.43 94.99 86.49 140.55 75.29 1106.73 
3/29/2002 141.12 104.16 89.67 154.44 82.56 1147.39 
4/30/2002 143.27 103.90 84.16 156.80 82.35 1076.92 
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5/31/2002 131.68 98.98 83.39 144.11 78.45 1067.14 
6/28/2002 121.66 99.63 77.35 133.15 78.97 989.82 
7/31/2002 104.41 92.22 71.24 114.27 73.09 911.62 
8/30/2002 102.73 87.93 71.59 112.43 69.69 916.07 
9/30/2002 93.21 80.48 63.71 102.01 63.79 815.28 
10/31/2002 97.03 75.07 69.22 106.19 59.50 885.76 
11/29/2002 108.95 79.62 73.17 119.24 63.11 936.31 
12/31/2002 102.58 78.75 68.76 112.26 62.42 879.82 
1/31/2003 96.50 73.05 66.87 105.61 57.90 855.70 
2/28/2003 93.11 62.47 65.73 101.90 49.51 841.15 
3/31/2003 97.07 61.83 66.28 106.23 49.01 848.18 
4/30/2003 109.29 66.09 71.65 119.61 52.38 916.92 
5/30/2003 116.64 75.37 75.30 127.65 59.74 963.59 
6/30/2003 115.41 74.44 76.15 126.30 59.00 974.50 
7/31/2003 127.10 80.68 77.39 139.10 63.95 990.31 
8/29/2003 130.39 81.54 78.77 142.70 64.63 1008.01 
9/30/2003 134.63 88.77 77.83 147.34 70.36 995.97 
10/31/2003 135.46 89.29 82.11 148.25 70.77 1050.71 
11/28/2003 143.02 94.81 82.70 156.52 75.15 1058.20 
12/31/2003 146.66 100.50 86.89 160.50 79.66 1111.92 
1/30/2004 149.37 103.99 88.39 163.47 82.42 1131.13 
2/27/2004 156.49 102.42 89.47 171.26 81.18 1144.94 
3/31/2004 162.30 107.29 88.01 177.62 85.04 1126.21 
4/30/2004 166.26 95.90 86.53 181.95 76.01 1107.30 
5/31/2004 167.79 100.37 87.58 183.63 79.55 1120.68 
6/30/2004 179.59 103.38 89.15 196.54 81.94 1140.84 
7/30/2004 171.68 103.56 86.10 187.89 82.08 1101.72 
8/31/2004 171.72 107.38 86.29 187.93 85.11 1104.24 
9/30/2004 186.92 109.90 87.10 204.57 87.11 1114.58 
10/29/2004 198.81 113.05 88.32 217.58 89.60 1130.20 
11/30/2004 210.45 120.28 91.73 230.32 95.33 1173.82 
12/31/2004 233.40 130.05 94.71 255.43 103.08 1211.92 
1/31/2005 229.71 121.49 92.31 251.40 96.29 1181.27 
2/28/2005 236.49 119.85 94.06 258.82 94.99 1203.60 
3/31/2005 237.02 119.73 92.26 259.40 94.90 1180.59 
4/29/2005 221.27 121.69 90.40 242.16 96.45 1156.85 
5/31/2005 231.80 125.59 93.11 253.68 99.54 1191.50 
6/30/2005 218.35 130.87 93.10 238.96 103.73 1191.33 
7/29/2005 233.89 137.46 96.45 255.97 108.95 1234.18 
8/31/2005 212.38 132.29 95.37 232.43 104.85 1220.33 
9/30/2005 207.43 129.52 96.03 227.01 102.66 1228.81 
10/31/2005 196.31 125.71 94.32 214.84 99.64 1207.01 
11/30/2005 220.05 133.03 97.64 240.82 105.44 1249.48 
12/30/2005 222.92 136.21 97.55 243.96 107.96 1248.29 
1/31/2006 238.29 146.59 100.03 260.79 116.19 1280.08 
2/28/2006 239.84 146.42 100.08 262.48 116.05 1280.66 
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3/31/2006 259.57 153.27 101.19 284.07 121.48 1294.83 
4/28/2006 274.70 151.70 102.42 300.63 120.24 1310.61 
5/31/2006 272.04 146.80 99.25 297.72 116.35 1270.09 
6/30/2006 278.08 156.74 99.26 304.33 124.23 1270.20 
7/31/2006 237.07 152.73 99.77 259.45 121.05 1276.66 
8/31/2006 254.48 159.25 101.89 278.50 126.22 1303.82 
9/29/2006 260.65 159.68 104.39 285.25 126.56 1335.85 
10/31/2006 282.15 162.23 107.68 308.79 128.58 1377.94 
11/30/2006 323.42 170.62 109.46 353.95 135.23 1400.63 
12/29/2006 335.76 166.94 110.84 367.46 132.32 1418.30 
1/31/2007 367.23 175.74 112.39 401.90 139.29 1438.24 
2/28/2007 350.47 173.78 109.94 383.55 137.74 1406.82 
3/30/2007 350.04 177.10 111.04 383.08 140.37 1420.86 
4/30/2007 345.12 175.21 115.84 377.70 138.87 1482.37 
5/31/2007 353.35 178.30 119.61 386.71 141.32 1530.62 
6/29/2007 344.78 167.56 117.48 377.33 132.81 1503.35 
7/31/2007 350.69 152.76 113.72 383.79 121.08 1455.27 
8/31/2007 377.28 156.50 115.19 412.89 124.04 1473.99 
9/28/2007 418.59 155.34 119.31 458.10 123.12 1526.75 
10/31/2007 420.79 156.69 121.08 460.51 124.19 1549.38 
11/30/2007 374.81 133.40 112.59 410.19 105.73 1440.70 
 
 
   
VITA 
 
Jing Yang 
 
Candidate for the Degree of 
 
Master of Science  
 
 
Thesis:   MERGER ABNORMAL RETURNS AND PAYMENT METHODS 
OF HOSPITALITY FIRMS 
 
 
 
Major Field:  Hospitality Administration 
 
Biographical: 
 
Personal Data:   
Born in P.R.China, Jing Yang is the Daughter of Shicong Yang and Weixin Li.  
 
Education: 
Completed the requirements for the Master of Science in Hospitality 
Administration at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in May 
2008. 
  
 
  
ADVISER’S APPROVAL: Dr. Hailin Qu 
 
 
 
 
Name: Jing Yang                                                             Date of Degree: May, 2008 
 
Institution: Oklahoma State University                      Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma 
 
Title of Study: MERGER ABNORMAL RETURNS AND PAYMENT METHODS 
OF HOSPITALITY FIRMS 
Pages in Study: 68                       Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science 
Major Field: Hospitality Administration 
 
Scope and Method of Study: The study aims to examine the long term abnormal returns 
to hospitality acquirers as well as the association between excess returns and 
merger financing methods and size from 1996 to 2007. The study applies 
regression analysis with secondary data examining 19 hospitality acquirers.  
 
Findings and Conclusions:  Hospitality acquirers receive positive abnormal returns 12 
months post merger and there is negative association between the cash payment 
and absolute size of the merger deals with the percentage excess returns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
